The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Federal Statutes by Jones, Harry W.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 25 Issue 1 
January 1939 
The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of 
Federal Statutes 
Harry W. Jones 
Columbia University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Harry W. Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 25 
WASH. U. L. Q. 002 (1939). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol25/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
2 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 25
THE PLAIN MEANING RULE AND EXTRINSIC AIDS
IN THE INTERPRETATION OF FEDERAL STATUTES
HARRY WILLMER JONESt
The orthodox jurisprudential theory that judicial thinldng is
rarely originative, but involves normally only the discovery and
application of pre-existing law, is implemented by two concepts
or formulae which, supposedly, enable judges to extract neat
rules of decision for particular cases from the approved legal
sources. In the decision of controversies according to the com-
mon law, the formula is that judges are bound to follow the
"holdings" or rationes decidendi of the decisions of the past. In
the judicial application of statute law, the basic conception is
that doubts as to the meaning or legal effect of statutory provi-
sions are to be resolved in accordance with "the intention of the
legislature."
Pointing out that there is in our law no accepted measure by
which the "holding" or ratio decidendi of a past case is to be
determined,' modern legal realists have won general acceptance
for their thesis that it is unrealistic to consider judges as wholly
bound by the "holdings" of past cases, since they have the power,
within vague and undefined limits, to determine what fiose "hold-
ings" actually are. Similarly, it is argued vigorously that the
notion of "legislative intention" is a concept of purely fictional
status, and that the judicial application of the statute law should
be governed rather by the personal conviction of the judge with
respect to the worth of the competing interests involved in par-
ticular controversies. 2
It is beyond the scope of the present article to consider in
detail the essential reality of the concept of "legislative inten-
tion."3 It is true, of course, that the decision of particular cases
St LL.B., Washington University, 1934; A.B., 1937; LL.M., Columbia
University, 1939. Visiting Lecturer in Law, Columbia University.
1. See, for example, Llewellyn, The Rule of Law in Our Case Law of
Contract (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 1243, in which the author enumerates seven
different measures which courts actually apply in determining the proposi-
tion of law or "holding" which a precedent may be taken to establish. And
see Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis (1924) 14 A. B. A. J. 71.
2. For a trenchant statement of this point of view see Radin, Statutory
Interpretation (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 863.
3. On the general subject, see Landis, A Note on Statutory Interpre-
tation (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 886; Horack, In the Name of Legislative
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by reference to the general commands of the statute law involves
problems as difficult as those inherent in common law judicial
decision. A legislative direction must be expressed in words,
and words are notoriously inexact and imperfect symbols for the
communication of ideas.4 To determine from the language of an
enactment the "legislative intention," in the sense of a pre-exist-
ing understanding as to its meaning or legal effect, may involve
semantic problems of almost insurmountable difficulty. If, in
Lieber's definition, 5 "Interpretation is the art of finding out the
true sense of any form of words, that is the sense which their
author intended to convey," it is evident that any serious effort
on the part of judges to discover the thought or reference be-
hind the language of a statute must be based upon a painstaking
endeavor to reconstruct the setting or context in which the statu-
tory words were employed.6
Even more difficult are the cases in which the governing inter-
pretative issue is one which was not, and perhaps could not have
been, foreseen even in the most general outline by the legislators
responsible for the enactment. In such cases more is required
of the judge than the discovery of a pre-existing and ascertain-
able meaning; the "interpreting" judge must perform the origi-
native function of assigning to the statute a meaning or legal
effect whi.1 i it did not possess before his action.7 Dean Landis
Intention (1932) 38 W. Va. L. Q. 119; Corry, Administrative Law and
the Interpretation of Statutes (1936) 1 U. of Toronto L. J. 286. An
analysis of the concept of "legislative intention," by the present writer,
will appear in a forthcoming number of the Columbia Law Review.
4. Ogden & Richards, The Meaning of Meaning (1923); Chase, The
Tyranny of Words (1938).
5. Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics (3d ed. 1880, by W. G.
Hammond) 11.
6. " * * * any ascertainment of the meaning of language requires con-
sideration of the atmosphere in which the conveyance originated, and ascer-
tainment of the associations or connections understood by the conveyor to
exist between the terms of the conveyance and the various possible objects
in the external world. By this process, selected symbols which imperfectly
symbolize the conveyor's idea are made more understandable, and the
danger, that a selected symbol will call up in the mind of the construer
a different idea from that which the conveyor intended to symbolize, is
lessened. Language is capable of clear meaning only when read in the
light of the circumstances of its employment." Restatement, Property,
Explanatory Notes (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1937) sec. 241, quoted in R. Powell,
Construction of Written Instruments (1939) 14 Ind. L. J. 199, 231.
7. "Interpretation is often spoken of as if it were nothing but the search
and the discovery of a meaning which, however obscure and latent, had
none the less a real and ascertainable pre-existence in the legislator's mind.
The process is, indeed, that at times, but it is often something more."
Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921) 14. Compare Gray,
The Nature and Sources of the Law (1909) 165.
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has remarked that the term, "legislative intention," may be taken
to signify either the more immediate concept of meaning or the
teleological concept of :purpose.3 The principle that courts are
bound to follow "the intention of the legislature" requires, in this
latter signification of "intention" that interpretative issues, un-
foreseen specifically by the legislators, should be resolved in such
a way as to advance rather than to retard the attainment of the
objectives which the legislators sought to achieve by the enact-
ment of the legislation.
It is evident that a judge cannot, from a bare reading of the
text of a statute, form any accurate idea either of the construc-
tion placed upon it by its framers, or of the purposes which the
members of the legislature sought to accomplish by its passage.9
Judicial reference to the actual circumstances of the passage of
the legislation, that is, to its. legislative history and to the clari-
fying statements made in committee reports and during discus-
sion on the floor by responsible legislators, is the prerequisite
to intelligent comprehension of "legislative intention" in either
sense. If a legislative understanding with respect to the inter-
pretative issue of a given case actually existed, it can be dis-
covered only when the statutory language is put in its full con-
text. If such a specific understanding is non-existent or undis-
coverable, "legislative intention," in the sense of the moving
purposes underlying the legislation, must be found in sources
of the same, or of even more comprehensive, character.
Examination of the relevant cases decided by the Supreme
Court and by the lower federal courts, particularly since the
decision of Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States,0 in
1892, reveals that the judges have come to rely, increasingly,
upon such extrinsic aids as committee reports and records of
legislative history, in the interpretation of Congressional enact-
ments."1 Extrinsic aids, however, are not treated as significant
8. Landis, A Note on Statutory Interpretation (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev.
886.
9. "A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin
of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and context according
to the circumstances and the time in which it was used." Holmes, J., in
Towne v. Eisner (1918) 245 U. S. 418, 425.
10. 143 U. S. 457.
11. Chamberlain, The Courts and Committee Reports (1933) 1 U. of Chi.
L. Rev. 81; Miller, The Value of Legislative History of Federal Statutes
(1925) 73 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 158; Frankham, Use of Legislative Debates
and Committee Reports in Statutory Interpretation (1933) 2 Brooklyn L.
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in every case involving the interpretation of a federal statute.
Even the federal courts continue to assert, although not always
to apply, the "plain meaning rule," that
* * * where the language of an enactment is clear and con-
struction according to its terms does not lead to absurd or
impracticable consequences, the words employed are to be
taken as the final expression of the meaning intended.1 2
The present discussion is intended as an analysis of judicial
theory and practice, with respect to the plain meaning rule, with
particular reference to a number of highly relevant decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States.
The plain meaning rule seems to have been intended, originally,
to rule out the traditional judicial doctrine of "the equity of the
statute," a doctrine which justified alterations in the literal mean-
ing of statutory language to avoid results which, in the opinion
of an interpreting judge, were unfair or inequitable. The main
effect of the rule in modern statutory interpretation, however, is
that it bars resort to otherwise admissible extrinsic aids, evi-
dencing the meaning or purpose of the enacting legislators, in
cases which, in the judgment of the deciding court, fall within
the scope of its operation. Whenever one encounters a statement
of the rule in a modern judicial opinion, there is a strong proba-
bility that further examination of the record in the case will
disclose that counsel for one party or the other had attempted
to introduce a committee report or other legislative record in
support of his interpretation of the statute.
Thus, in representative opinions, the Supreme Court has em-
ployed the plain meaning doctrine as a rule of exclusion, barring
the presentation, as aids to interpretation, of committee reports, 13
records of the legislative history of an act,14 administrative con-
Rev. 173; McManes, Effect of Legislative History on Judicial Decision(1937) 5 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 235; tenBroek, Admissibility of Congressional
Debates in Statutory Construction by the United States Supreme Court
(1937) 25 Calif. L. Rev. 326; Wagner, Use and Abuse of Legislative His-
tory in the Construction of a Statute (1938) 5 I. C. C. Prac. Jour. 485.
12. United States v. Missouri Pac. Ry. (1929) 278 U. S. 269, 278.
13. Pennsylvania R. R. v. International Coal Mining Co. (1913) 230
U. S. 184; Railroad Comm. of Wis. v. Chicago, B., & Q. R. R. (1922) 257
U. S. 563; Helvering v. City Bank (1935) 296 U. S. 85.
14. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n (1897) 177 U. S.
290; Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Vindicator Consolidated Gold Mining
Co. (1931) 284 U. S. 231. Cf. Matson Nay. Co. v. United States (1932)
284 U. S. 352, 356, in which Stone, J., said: "As the words of the statute
are plain, we are not at liberty to add to or alter them to effect a purpose
which does not appear on its face or from its legislative history."
1939]
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struction,5 and other sources extrinsic to the text of an enact-
ment.:( This effect of the plain meaning doctrine as a rule of
exclusion is indicated by the language of Mr. Justice Sutherland
in United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co.,17 in which
the Supreme Court refused to consider committee reports of-
fered as evidence of Congressional intention:
In proper cases, such reports are given consideration in
determining the meaning of a statute, but only where that
meaning is doubtful. They cannot be resorted to for the
purpose of construing a statute contrary to its plain terms.
* ** Like other extrinsic aids to construction, their use is
"to solve but not to create an ambiguity."
Judges have been reluctant to concede that the rule that they
are bound by the "plain meaning" of statutory language is in-
consistent with the general principle that the end of statutory
interpretation is the discovery and application of "the intention
of the legislature," and several familiar circumlocutions have
been employed in attempted reconciliation. In certain cases, the
effort has been made to square the plain meaning rule with the
general theory of interpretation by the statement that the statu-
tory language, if "plain and unambiguous" is "the sole evidence
of the ultimate legislative intention." 8 In other opinions, the
explanation has been that the legislature is "conclusively pre-
sumed" to have intended the meaning which "plain words" neces-
sarily bear. 9
Realistic analysis of the plain meaning doctrine, however, must
be based upon full recognition that interpretation according to
the literal approach does not involve any effort to discover "the
intention of the legislature," in the sense of a meaning or pur-
pose which the draftsmen of a statute ever actually entertained.
Whenever, in the judgment of the interpreting court, the lan-
guage of a statute "standing alone, is fairly susceptible of but
15. Koshland v. Helvering (1936) 298 U. S. 441; Banco Mexicano v.
Deutsche Bank (1924) 263 U. S. 591.
16. Hamilton v. Rathbone (1899) 175 U. S. 414 (past acts); Cornell v.
Coyne (1904) 192 U. S. 418, 430 (title of statute). And see Johnson v.
United States (C. C. A. 7, 1914) 215 Fed. 679 (statements of author).
17. (1932) 287 U. S. 77, 83.
18. Caminetti v. United States (1917) 242 U. S. 470, 490.
19. Frequently, also, the statement found is that the "legislative in-
tention" controls, but that the court must limit its consideration to the
"intention" as expressed in the statute. United States v. Goldenberg (1897)
168 U. S. 95, 103.
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one construction," 20 the plain meaning rule, at least theoretically,
bars any further inquiry into the actual thought or idea which
the members of the legislature sought to communicate through
the statutory language.
That the plain meaning rule, within the scope of its applica-
tion, justifies the preference of a supposed literal meaning borne
by the words of a statute, over the sense in which the legislature
intended them to be understood, may be illustrated by a number
of federal decisions.21 Probably the clearest case in this connec-
tion is Caminetti v. United States,22 decided in 1917, in which
the Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether the lately
adopted Mann Act, which made it a federal offense to aid in the
transportation of a woman across a state line "for the purpose
of prostitution or debauchery or for any other immoral purpose,"
applied to a case in which a young college man, accompanied by
an agreeable co-ed, had driven across a state boundary on the
way to a tavern at which the two were to spend the night. The
defendant had had intercourse with the girl, but no commercial
element had entered into the transaction.
It seems perfectly clear that the author of the Mann Act, and
the Congressional committees which considered it, had not in-
tended to make such conduct as that outlined above, punishable
by the Federal Government. The title of the enactment, The
White Slave Traffic Act, suggests that Congress was striking
solely at the interstate ramifications of commercialized vice. In
fact, Representative Mann, speaking as the author of the bill
and as chairman of the committee in charge, had assured mem-
bers of the House, who had raised this very issue, that the Act
was aimed only at "vice as a business."
Nevertheless, the majority of the Supreme Court held that the
meaning of the statutory language was "plain and unambiguous"
and that conduct of the type in question was clearly within the
denotation of "other immoral purpose." Extrinsic evidence of
the actual intention of Congress was excluded, and the majority
opinion, written by Mr. Justice Day, stated :23
20. Hamilton v. Rathbone (1899) 175 U. S. 414, 419.
21. For example, Banco Mexicano v. Deutsche Bank (1924) 263 U. S.
591; Hildick Apple Juice Co. v. Williams (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1920) 269
Fed. 184. And see Lake County v. Rollins (1899) 130 U. S. 662.
22. 242 U. S. 470.
23. Id. at 490.
1939]
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol25/iss1/3
8 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 25
* * when words are free from doubt they must be taken
as the final expression of the legislative intent, and are not
to be added to or subtracted from by considerations drawn
from titles or designating names or reports, accompanying
their introduction or from any extraneous source. * * * the
language being plain, and not leading to absurd or wholly
impracticable consequences; it is the sole evidence of the
ultimate legislative intent.
Mr. Justice McKenna, dissenting, filed a vigorous opinion,
studded with citations drawn from the legislative records, and
taxed the majority of the Court with open disregard of the un-
disputed legislative intention.
Under the plain meaning rule, as applied in such decisions as
that of the Caminetti case, extrinsic aids offered by counsel as
evidence of "the intention of the legislature," are rejected if the
words of the statute involved are "plain and unambiguous." It
may be difficult to grasp the significance of the terms "plain"
and "unambiguous" as used in this connection, unless it is kept
in mind that in our legal system statutes are not given a general
judicial exposition in abstraction from particular litigated fact-
situations. The point here raised would be unecessary if it were
not for the fact that analytically-minded writers on statutory
interpretation have developed a subtle jurisprudential distinc-
tion between the "meaning" of a statute and its "application" to
the facts of a given case.
In a still influential article,24 published in 1913, Dean Pound
divided the judicial process in dealing with statutes into three
stages: (1) finding the statute; (2) interpreting it, that is, ar-
riving at its meaning; and (3) applying it to the facts of a
given case. This analysis gives the impression that the discov-
ery of the meaning of a statute and the determination of its
applicability to a particular fact-situation are separate opera-
tions, successive in point of time. Professor de Sloovere, who has
accepted the analysis as a working principle, has carried the
distinction between "meaning" and "application" to its logical
conclusion :25
24. Courts and Legislation (1913) 77 Cent. L. J. 219, 222. The analysis
is also found in Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law (1922)
c.3.
25. de Sloovere, Textual Interpretation of Statutes (1934) 11 N. Y.
U. L. Q. Rev. 538, 553, 554. And see de Sloovere, Steps in the Process of
Interpreting Statutes (1932) 10 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 1. For further impli-
cations drawn from the distinction, see de Sloovere, The Functions of Judge
and Jury in the Interpretation of Statutes (1933) 46 Harv. L. Rev. 1086.
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After the single meaning has been found, the remaining
difficulties are those of applying the statute to the case at
hand. For example, whether radio broadcasting is a "public
performance for profit" does not, without more, involve any
question of interpretation at all, since the words themselves
are clear and explicit. In other words, apart from or in rela-
tion to any case, the language is not susceptible of more than
one meaning.
What Dean Pound and Professor de Sloovere seem to be sug-
gesting is that in determining the effect of a statute in particular
situations of fact, the court must first determine the connota-
tion26 of the general terms of the statute, and then determine their
denotation, that is, their applicability to the concrete facts of an
actual case. Whatever merits this distinction may have, and the
present writer doubts even its general validity,27 it may lead to
misunderstanding in an attempt to analyze the significance of
"plain" and "unambiguous" as those terms are employed in
judicial decisions on the plain meaning rule. A distinction be-
tween the "meaning" of a statute and its "application" would
appear to suggest that a statute may have a "plain meaning"
which would bar resort to extrinsic aids, although the effect of
the statute upon the particular case in question is subject to seri-
ous doubts. The courts, however, employ the phrase "plain mean-
ing" without regard to the jurisprudential distinction drawn be-
tween "meaning" and "application."
"Plain meaning," as that term is used in judicial opinions,
refers not to the abstract coherence or intelligibility of a statute,
but rather to the direction which the statute affords to the judge
as to the decision of a particular controversy. The "plain mean-
ing" which bars resort to extrinsic aids is not a meaning "apart
from any case" but a meaning with particular reference to the
26. "A term may be viewed in two ways, either as a class of objects
(which may have only one member) or as a set of attributes or character-
istics which determine the objects. The first phase or aspect is called the
denotation or extension of the term, while the second is called the connota-
tion or intension." Cohen & Nagel, An Introduction to Logic and Scientific
Method (1934) 31. (Italics are the present writer's.)
27. When a judge refers to a statute it is for guidance as to the deci-
sion of a case, the particular facts of which are already known to him.
His thinking is affected throughout by his awareness of the facts of the
controversy which it is his duty to decide. Is it not an unrealistic descrip-
tion of actual judicial thinking to suggest that the judge arrives at a
determination of the abstract meaning of a statute befare he considers
its applicability to the particular case?
1939]
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case presented for decision. The same statutory provision may
be held to have a "plain meaning" with respect to certain con-
troversies, but to be "ambiguous" with respect to others.28 A
statute is "ambiguous," and so open to explanation by extrinsic
aids, not only when its abstract meaning (that is, the connota-
tion of its terms) is uncertain, but also when it is uncertain in
its application to, or effect upon, the fact-situation of the case
at bar. The statement of the plain meaning rule in an actual case
implies that the judgment of the court is that the decision which
it has reached in the particular case is the only decision which
could possibly have been made without attributing to the words
of the statutory direction a meaning, that is, a connotation or
denotation, wholly unjustified by the accepted usages of speech.
The effect of the plain meaning rule, at least in theory, is to
restrict the office of extrinsic aids to the resolution of doubts as
to the effect of the statute concerned upon the particular case,
created by such causes as internal conflict in the statutory lan-
guage,'29 the vagueness of the connotation or denotation of the
statutory terms in accepted usage,30 or the existence in the statute
of terms which possess different popular and "trade" meanings.3 1
The Supreme Court has frequently quoted from the opinion of
Mr. Justice Brown in Hamilton v. Rathbone, 2 to the effect that
"the province of construction lies wholly within the domain of
ambiguity," and that extrinsic aids may be "resorted to to solve
but not to create an ambiguity." Not even committee reports,
generally regarded as the most reliable of the extrinsic aids, are
admissible as evidence that the decision directed by the supposed
"plain meaning" of the text of a statute is not the result which
the members of the legislature actually intended.
Theoretically, the plain meaning rule raises a preliminary issue
28. Compare Osaka Shosen Kaisha Line v. United States (1937) 300
U. S. 98, with Taylor v. United States (1907) 207 U. S. 120.
29. Interpretative problems of this character are illustrated by American
Net & Twine Co. v. Worthington (1891) 141 U. S. 468, and Arthur v.
Morrison (1877) 96 U. S. 108.
30. See, for example, the interpretative issues in U. S. Cartridge Co. v.
United States (1932) 284 U. S. 511; United States v. Louisville & N. R. R.
(1915) 236 U. S. 318; United States v. Rehwald (D. C. S. D. Cal. 1930)
44 F. (2d) 663.
31. See, for example, the interpretative issues in Bailey v. Clark (U. S.
1874) 21 Wall. 284 ("capital"); Nix v. Hedden (1893) 149 U. S. 304
("fruit" and "vegetables").
32. (1899) 175 U. S. 414, 421. (Italics are those of Brown, J.)
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of admissibility in every case, and the acceptance or rejection
of offered extrinsic aids should depend upon the disposition
which the court makes of that preliminary issue. The evidence
afforded by extrinsic aids, logically speaking, should be irrelevant
unless the interpreting court has first come to the conclusion
either that the statute is "ambiguous" with respect to the fact-
situation of the particular controversy, or that the application of
the statute, according to its literal meaning, would lead to "ab-
surd or wholly impracticable consequences." The frequently
quoted formula that extrinsic aids may be resorted to "to solve
but not to create an ambiguity" can only mean that the evidence
provided by such aids should be considered solely for the light
which it throws upon the proper resolution of a doubt or "am-
biguity" apparent to the court before it examines the extrinsic
sources. In other words, the theory of the plain meaning doc-
trine is that the "ambiguity" or "absurdity" which will take a
case outside the scope of its application must be discoverable
upon a bare or literal reading of the text, wholly apart from the
background or context which the committee reports and other
extrinsic sources provide. 3
With a few notable exceptions,34 writers on the subject of
statutory interpretation have accepted the plain meaning doc-
trine at its face value, that is, as a rule applied with fair con-
sistency by the courts in cases in which no "ambiguity" is dis-
coverable upon a literal reading of a statutory text.3 5 Close
consideration of a number of federal cases, in many of which
the opinion makes no mention of the plain meaning rule, has
brought the present writer to the conclusion that the doctrine is
not followed invariably by the courts, and that the incidence of
its application has been uncertain and unpredictable. In many
cases which, apparently, should have fallen within the scope of
the plain meaning rule, it has been disregarded and the literal
meaning of the language of the relevant statute subjected to
33. Hopkins, The Literal Canon and the Golden Rule (1937) 15 Can.
Bar Rev. 689.
34. R. Powell, Construction of Written Instruments (1939) 14 Ind. L. J.
199, 309, 397; Note, Legislative Materials to Aid Statutory Interpretation
(1937) 50 Harv. L. Rev. 822.
35. For example, Miller, The Value of Legislative History of Federal
Statutes (1925) 73 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 158; McManes, Effect of Legislative
History on Judicial Decision (1937) 5 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 235.
1939]
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material alteration. 38 A few instances should be sufficient to
indicate the dimensions of the gulf between asserted judicial
theory and actual judicial practice in the interpretation of Con-
gressional enactments.
Of the many cases in which the Supreme Court has assigned
to a statute an interpretation in conflict with the literal meaning
of its text, perhaps the most generally known are those in which
the "rule of reason" was read into the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
By the express words of the enactment, it was provided that
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or other-
wise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce ***
is declared to be illegal.
It would be difficult to conceive of more inclusive words in which
the prohibition might have been drafted, unless, as suggested by
an irreverent former student of the writer, the statute had con-
tinued, "and by every combination we mean every doggone one."
In the first cases in which counsel for indicted combinations
made the effort to restrict the prohibition of the act to combina-
tions in "unreasonable" restraint of trade, the Supreme Court
rejected the "rule of reason," as in conflict both with the plain
meaning and with the purpose of the statute.37 Fifteen years
later, after several unsuccessful efforts had been made to secure
a restrictive amendment of the Anti-Trust Law, 38 the Supreme
Court reopened the question in Standard Oil Co. v. United
States,39 and by an eight-to-one majority read the "rule of rea-
son" into the Sherman Act. The majority interpretation seems
to have been based, in part, upon the theory that it was the
actual "intention" of Congress to adopt the common law standard
with respect to restraint of trade, and some reference was made
to extrinsic sources, notably to the debates, as evidence of that
36. United States v. Alabama Great Southern R. R. (1892) 142 U. S.
615; Coosaw Mining Co. v. South Carolina (1892) 144 U. S. 550; Lucken-
bach S. S. Co. v. United States (1930) 280 U. S. 173; and cases cited else-
where in the text and footnotes of this article.
37. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n (1897) 166 U. S.
290. The dissent of White, Ch. J., later became the position of the Court.
38. "At every session of Congress since the 1896 decision, Congress re-
fused to change the policy it had declared or to so amend the Act of 1890
as to except from its operation contracts, combinations, and trusts that
reasonably restrain competition." Harlan, J., dissenting, in part, in Stand-
ard Oil Co. v. United States (1911) 221 U. S. 1, 91.
39. (1911) 221 U. S. 1. Accord: United States v. American Tobacco Co.
(1911) 221 U. S. 106.
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intention. Mr. Justice Harlan, disagreeing with the majority
conclusion, stated his objection in vigorous terms :40
* * * if I do not misapprehend its opinion, the court has
now read into the act of Congress words which are not to be
found there, and has thereby done that which it adjudged in
1896 and 1898 could not be done without violating the Con-
stitution, namely, by interpretation of a statute, changed a
public policy declared by the legislative department.
It may be noted, parenthetically, that the majority opinion of
Chief Justice White in the case in question is rather unconvinc-
ing with respect to the actual legislative intention. The immedi-
ate point, however, is that the case offers a strong instance of
judicial disregard of the plain meaning rule.
Another instance of judicial failure to apply the literal mean-
ing of a statute is the 1921 decision in Duplex Printing Press Co.
2. Deering41 in which the majority of the Supreme Court upheld
an injunction granted under the Clayton Act, restraining labor
union officials from continuing to carry on a secondary boycott,
in the effort to compel the complainant manufacturer to give
recognition to the union and to grant a closed shop. The sections
of the Clayton Act exempting labor unions from its general pro-
visions are too detailed for full citation here, but it should be
noted that section 20 of the Act read, in part:
No such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any
person or persons, whether singly or in concert * * * from
ceasing to patronize any party to such [labor] dispute, or
from recommending, advising, or persuading others by
peaceful and lawful means to do so.
In spite of the apparent "plain meaning" of the text of the Clay-
ton Act, the Court majority held that the facts of the case were
not within the scope of the statutory immunity from injunctive
process. The majority opinion of Mr. Justice Pitney made ex-
haustive reference to extrinsic aids and called particular atten-
tion to the fact that the chairman of the House Committee, in
reporting the bill, had denied explicitly that the statute was in-
tended to legalize the secondary boycott. In the dissenting opin-
ion of Mr. Justice Brandeis, 42 concurred in by Justices Holmes
40. (1911) 221 U. S. 1, 104.
41. 254 U. S. 443.
42. Mr. Justice Brandeis has been a consistent advocate of the rule of
literalness in statutory and constitutional interpretation. See, for example,
his dissents in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering (1921) 254 U. S. 443;
1939]
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol25/iss1/3
14 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 25
and Clark, one of the points most strongly urged was that the
case fell within the plain meaning rule.
In Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States,4 3 decided in
1928, the Supreme Court had before it for interpretation a statute
which subjected the United States to certain suits in admiralty,
and provided that the District Courts
Shall have jurisdiction * * * to enter a judgment or decree
for the amount of the legal damages * * * if any shall be
found to be due either for or against the United States, upon
the same principle and measure of liability as in like cases
in admiralty between private parties.431
The immediate interpretative issue in the case was whether the
statute directed the allowance of interest against the United
States, interest being included in the "legal damages" which
would have been awarded as between private parties in com-
parable cases. The majority of the Court held that, despite the
apparent literal meaning of the text, it was not the intention of
Congress "to put the United States on the footing of private
parties in all respects." Four justices dissented, and the minority
opinion of Mr. Justice Sutherland expressed the contention that
"it follows indubitably from the words of the statute" that in-
terest should be allowed against the United States. In conclusion,
Mr. Justice Sutherland stated :44
To refuse interest in this case, in my opinion, is completely
to change the clear meaning of the words employed by Con-
gress by invoking the aid of extrinsic circumstances to im-
port into the statute an ambiguity which otherwise does not
exist and thereby to set at naught the prior decisions of this
Court and long established canons of statutory construction.
By way of contrast, the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes
made reference to statutes in pari materic and to the legislative
history of the act, and concluded with the unusually frank state-
ment :45
It is said that when the meaning of language is plain we
are not to resort to evidence in order to raise doubts. This
and in Evans v. Gore (1920) 253 U. S. 245; and his opinion for the Court
in State Board of Equalization of Cal. v. Young's Market Co. (1936) 299
U. S. 59, 63.
43. 278 U. S. 41.
43a. (1922) 42 Stat. 1590, c. 192.
44. Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States (1926) 278 U. S. 41, 55.
45. Id. at 48. Compare: Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation
(1899) 12 Harv. L. Rev. 417, Collected Legal Papers (1921) 203.
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is rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does
not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists.
Instances could be multiplied in which the Supreme Court and
the lower federal courts have, virtually without explanation, dis-
regarded the plain meaning rule so rigidly applied in the Cami-
netti decision. Detailed consideration here will be restricted to
two additional cases of comparatively recent occurrence. The
factual background of Texas & Pacific Railway v. United States, 46
decided by the Supreme Court in 1933, was that certain railroads
had offered substantially the same rates on import and export
traffic between New Orleans and inland points as were charged
between those points and certain Texas ports, although the rail
haul to New Orleans was, in each instanc, much the longer. The
Interstate Commerce Commission, after a finding of undue pref-
erence to New Orleans and undue prejudice to the Texas ports,
prescribed minimum rate differentials in favor of the Texas
ports where the New Orleans haul was more than twenty-five
per cent longer. Statutory authority for the Commission order
was supposedly found in section 3 (1) of the Act to Regulate
Commerce, which provides :461
It shall be unlawful for any common carrier*** to make
or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage
to any particular person * * * or locality, * * * in any respect
whatsoever, or to subject any particular person * * * or
locality, * * * to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or
disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.
The Supreme Court, by a five to four decision, held the Com-
mission order invalid, as beyond the scope of its statutory author-
ity. Mr. Justice Roberts, writing the opinion for the majority,
made extensive reference to committee reports and to the legis-
lative history of the statute in support of his conclusion that it
was not the intention of Congress to remove discriminations
against seaports, "in respect of traffic to which they are in no
sense points of origin or destination." One of the points made by
Mr. Justice Stone47 in his dissenting opinion was that
On its face the prohibition of any undue and unreasonable
prejudice to "any particular locality," "in any respect what-
46. 289 U. S. 627.
46a. (1887) 24 Stat. 380, c. 104, sec. 3, 49 U. S. C. A. sec. 3(1). (Italics
supplied).
47. Texas & Pacific Ry. v. United States (1933) 289 U. S. 627, 658.
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ever," would seem so plainly to include a port as to leave
no room for construction.
Perhaps the most revealing single case of disregard of the
plain meaning rule is Helvering v. New York Trust Co.,48 de-
cided by the Supreme Court in 1934, involving the interpretation
of a provision of the Revenue Act of 1921 which subjected net
gain from the sale of "capital assets" to a tax rate much lower
than that on ordinary income. In the statute, the term "capital
assets" was defined as "property acquired and held by the tax-
payer for profit or investment for more than two years." The
circumstances of the particular controversy were that a gain
had been realized from the sale of securities which had been
transferred to the trustee of an irrevocable trust, the sale hav-
ing been made within less than two years after the creation of
the trust, although more than two years after the settlor had
acquired the securities.
The decision of the Court majority was that the gain so real-
ized was "a gain from the sale of capital assets" and taxable at
the lower rate, although the securities had not been "held by
the taxpayer" for more than two years, as required in the statu-
tory definition. Mr. Justice Butler justified his departure from
the literal or plain meaning of the statutory language on the
ground that the purpose of the statute, as disclosed in the ex-
trinsic sources, was to promote the free exchange of frozen se-
curities, and that the decision reached would advance that under-
lying purpose. Mr. Justice Butler said further: 411
The rule that where the statute contains no ambiguity, it
must be taken literally and given effect according to its lan-
guage is a sound one not to be put aside to avoid hardships
that may sometimes result from giving effect to the legis-
lative purpose. * * * But the expounding of a statutory pro-
vision according to the letter without regard to the other
parts of the Act and legislative history would often defeat
the object intended to be accomplished.
Mr. Justice Roberts, dissenting, pointed out that the interpre-
tation of the majority not only violated the plain meaning rule
but also conflicted with administrative rulings which, for twelve
years after the first adoption of the statutory provision, had
48. 292 U. S. 455.
49. Id. at 464.
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denied the benefit of the "capital gains" provision to one who
had not, himself, held the property for two years or more.
The cases discussed in comparative detail in the preceding
pages are not in any sense unique or unrepresentative. It seems
a safe generalization to say that the plain meaning rule is dis-
regarded in actual judicial practice at least as often as it is
applied as a controlling principle in cases involving the interpre-
tation of Congressional enactments.50 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, has not openly discarded the rule of literalness, and there
are recent decisions of the federal courts in which it appears
with unimpaired vitality.51 Perhaps the most remarkable exam-
ple of the lengths to which courts sometimes go into their appli-
cation of this literal canon of construction is United States -v.
Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co.,5 2 in which Mr. Justice Suther-
land, writing the opinion for the Court majority, first repunctu-
ated an originally doubtful statute in such a way as to alter its
essential tenor, and then announced that the statute, as repunc-
tuated, possessed a single plain meaning which barred the con-
sideration of committee reports offered as evidence of the actual
intention of Congress."
In short, the plain meaning rule is applied or ignored, appar-
ently at the discretion of the interpreting judges, and it is im-
possible to frame any generalization concerning the conditions of
its applicability which will fit all of the cases. It may be observed
that the same uncertainty has characterized the application of
the plain meaning principle in cases of constitutional interpre-
tation.5 The existence of so fundamental a conflict in the judi-
50. Note, Legislative Materials to Aid Statutory Interpretation (1937)
50 Harv. L. Rev. 822; R. Powell, Construction of Written Instruments
(1939) 14 Ind. L. J. 309. And see cases cited in text and footnotes of this
article.
51. Osaka Shosen Kaisha Line v. United States (1937) 300 U. S. 98,
101; Koshland v. Helvering (1936) 298 U. S. 441, 447; Helvering v. City
Bank Farmers Trust Co. (1935) 296 U. S. 85, 89. And see State Board
of Equalization of Cal. v. Young's Market (1936) 299 U. S. 59, 63.
52. (1932) 287 U. S. 77.
53. See the comment on the instant case in Chamberlain, The Courts and
Committee Reports (1933) 1 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 81, pointing out that refer-
ence to available committee reports would have made possible a decision of
the case without the judicial legerdemain actually resorted to. The case
suggests that the plain meaning rule may not only lead to the frustration
of legislative purposes, but may also make the process of decision even
more laborious than would reference to extrinsic aids.
54. The rule of literalness was made applicable to constitutional inter-
pretation in Sturges v. Crowninshield (U. S. 1819) 4 Wheat. 122. But see
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cial approach to the interpretation of statutes makes impossible
any certain prediction with respect to the consideration which
will be given to extrinsic aids in a particular case in which the
bare text of a statute appears to suggest only a single possible
meaning. The rule of literalness, as actually employed, seems a
useful judicial argument in favor of exclusion, when the evidence
presented in the form of extrinsic aids suggests a decision which
is contrary to that which the interpreting judges deem just and
expedient. When judges discover, in the extrinsic aids, support
for what they consider a desirable addition to or subtraction
from the literal meaning of the statutory language, they usually
manage to make full use of it.
Specifically, it must be pointed out that the cases in which the
plain meaning rule has been, respectively, applied or ignored,
cannot be reconciled upon any theory that the literal meaning
of the statutory language, in the latter case, would have led to
"absurd or wholly impracticable consequences," within the theo-
retical requirements of that recognized exception to the plain
meaning doctrine. The restricted scope of the "absurdity" ex-
ception, in the theory of the Supreme Court, is suggested by the
often-quoted language of Chief Justice Marshall in Sturges v.
Crowninshield,"5 that a case for which the words of a statute
expressly provide may be excepted from its operation only where
* * * the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision
to the case, would be so monstrous, that all mankind would,
without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application.
A recent formulation of the conditions of applicability of the
"absurdity" exception is found in the opinion of Mr. Justice
Sutherland in Crooks v. Hcvrrelson,5 in which the requirement
the disregard of the literal meaning of constitutional provisions in Evans
v. Gore (1920) 253 U. S. 245; Popovici v. Alger (1930) 280 U. S. 379;
Smiley v. Holm (1932) 285 U. S. 355; and Williams v. United States(1933) 289 U. S. 553. Compare: Martin v. Hunter's Lessee (U. S. 1816) 1
Wheat. 304, 350; Hans v. Louisiana (1890) 134 U. S. 1; Missouri v.
Illinois (1901) 180 U. S. 208. On the general subject, see tenBroek, Ad-
missibility and Use by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids
in Constitutional Construction (1938) 26 Calif. L. Rev. 287, 437, and 664.
55. (U. S. 1819) 4 Wheat. 122, 202.
56. (1930) 282 U. S. 55. "Application of the principle so nearly ap-
proaches the boundary between the exercise of the judicial power and
that of the legislative power as to call rather for great caution and cir-
cumspection in order to avoid usurpation of the latter. * * * It is not
enough merely that hard and objectionable or absurd consequences, which
probably were not within the contemplation of the framers, are produced
by an act of legislation." Sutherland, J., at p. 60.
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stated was that "the absurdity must be so gross as to shock the
general moral or common sense." There are certain cases which
may perhaps be said to have fallen properly within the narrow
limits of the "absurdity" exception,57 but it is evident that none
of the cases mentioned in the preceding discussion as instances
of judicial disregard of the plain meaning rule involved any
absurdity "so gross as to shock the general moral or common
sense."
It should be understood, moreover, that the many instances
of judicial variation of the literal meaning of statutory language
cannot be reconciled with accepted theory upon any such ground
as that a result directed by the literal meaning of a statute is an
"absurd result," within that recognized exception to the rule of
literalness, if it is inconsistent with the general purposes which
the legislators had in mind at the time of the enactment of the
statute. What Mr. Justice Butler seems to have done in Helver-
ing v. New York Trust Co.58 is to have referred to extrinsic aids
to discover the underlying purpose of the statute involved in that
case, and then to have held that the literal meaning might be dis-
regarded, because the application of the statute according to its
bare text would be inconsistent with the legislative purpose so
discovered.
It is clear, however, that inconsistency between the underly-
ing purposes of a statute, as disclosed by sources extrinsic to its
text, and the result reached by the literal application of the
statutory language, does not constitute an "absurd result" or
"monstrous absurdity" within the theory of the plain meaning
rule. The "doubt" or "ambiguity" which will justify judicial de-
parture from the literal meaning of a statutory provision must,
in theory, have been apparent to the court before it examined
the extrinsic aids, that is, must have been discoverable upon a
bare or literal reading of the text. Reference to extrinsic aids
to determine whether the literal meaning of the statutory text
is consistent with the actual "intention," or purpose, of the legis-
57. United States v. Kirby (U. S. 1868) 7 Wall. 482; Church of the
Holy Trinity v. United States (U. S. 1892) 143 U. S. 457. See construc-
tion placed upon the Holy Trinity decision by Sutherland, J., in Crooks v.
Harrelson (1930) 282 U. S. 55, 69. But cf. Comm'r of Immigration v.
Gottlieb (1924) 265 U. S. 310. And see: United States v. Goldenberg
(1897) 168 U. S. 95, 103; Gulf States Steel Co. v. United States (1932)
287 U. S. 32, 45.
58. (1934) 292 U. S. 455.
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lators, is, in effect, a use of such sources to create a doubt or
ambiguity, and not to resolve a doubt or ambiguity apparent
upon the face of the statute. The analysis of federal decisions
is made very difficult by the failure of the judges to recognize,
or at least to concede, that departure from the plain or literal
meaning of a statutory provision, in order to give effect to the
actual purpose of Congress, is wholly inconsistent with the liter-
alistic approach to interpretation embodied in the plain meaning
rule.
Modern opinions of the Supreme Court and of the lower fed-
eral courts reflect a trend away from the literal approach and
towards the utilization of extrinsic evidence of legislative inten-
tion in every case in which such evidence is persuasive or sug-
gestive with respect to the interpretative issue in question. In a
majority of the modern federal cases in which the plain meaning
rule has been stated as a governing proposition, analysis dis-
closes that the evidence of the extrinsic aids offered was, in fact,
unpersuasive with respect to the Congressional intention and
could have been disregarded as of insufficient probative value,
without the statement of a flat exclusionary rule of theoretically
universal application.59 The retention of the rule of literalness
in the doctrine of interpretation, however, raises the possibility
in every case that its rigid application will lead to the exclusion
of highly relevant and persuasive extrinsic evidence of actual
Congressional intention.
The existing conflict in the decisions of the Supreme Court on
the question whether extrinsic aids can be considered in the
absence of a doubt as to statutory meaning apparent on the face
of the statute, leads to the result that the Court, in many cases,
can decide the ultimate interpretative issue either way, and can
support either conclusion with respectable authority. The judi-
cial process in statutory interpretation cannot become fully pre-
dictable until the Supreme Court has recognized the fundamental
confusion in its present practice and has decided either to aban-
don the plain meaning doctrine as applied in such cases as
59. Note, Legislative Materials to Aid Statutory Construction (1937)
50 Harv. L. Rev. 822. Note the general unpersuasiveness of the extrinsic
aids offered in Mackenzie. v. Hare (1915) 239 U. S. 299; Van Camp &
Sons Co. v. American Can Co. (1929) 278 U. S. 245; Wilbur v. United
States ex rel. Vindicator Consolidated Gold Mining Co. (1931) 284 U. S.
231.
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Caminetti v. United States,6 or to follow it resolutely in all the
cases which fall within the scope of its theoretical application.
It is the conviction of the present writer that the Supreme Court
should openly discard the rule of literalness, as it exists in theory,
and so conform the doctrine of interpretation to prevailing judi-
cial practice. Careful analysis of the assumptions upon which
the rule is based, and of the arguments of judicial policy urged
in its support, justifies the conclusion that the rule is an inap-
propriate one in the interpretation of modern Congressional
enactments.
Different judges, and writers on statutory interpretation, have
offered several justifications in support of the doctrine that the
"plain meaning" of a statute should be applied, despite the pos-
sibility that the decisions so reached will be in opposition to the
actual intention of the legislature.- The rule has the obvious
convenience of enabling judges to decide certain cases without
the undeniable labor involved in going over the history of a
statute, the committee reports, and the other sources which
might contain some clue as to what the meaning or purpose
which the legislators had in mind may have been. That the
plain meaning rule is not founded upon a policy of judicial con-
venience, however, is shown by the existence of the established
rule that extrinsic aids may be resorted to in confirmation of
the literal meaning of the statutory language.
62
The chief argument advanced in favor of the rule of literal-
ness is that it brings certainty, that is, uniformity and predicta-
bility of decision, into statutory interpretations. A statute, after
all, is not only a command to the courts; it is also a rule to which
individuals may refer for guidance in planning their conduct,
and private citizens can hardly be expected to make reference
to committee reports and other legislative records. The fear
has been expressed by Mr. Justice Sutherland 3 that the inter-
pretation of a statute, other than according to its literal mean-
ing, might make of the enactment "a concealed trap for the un-
suspecting." The force of this objection is, of course, undeniable.
60. (1917) 242 U. S. 470.
61. For a general discussion of the root assumptions of the plain mean-
ing rule, see Hopkins, The Literal Canon and the Golden Rule (1937) 15
Can. Bar Rev. 689.
62. United States v. Missouri Pac. R. R. (1929) 278 U. S. 269, 278.
And see Martin v. Hunter's Lessee (U. S. 1816) 1 Wheat. 304, 350.
63. Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co. (1929) 278 U. S. 245,
253.
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It may be noted in the first place, however, that the predicta-
bility argument, even if completely valid otherwise, would be
appropriate only in cases in which a party can show that he
has acted to his disadvantage in reliance upon the "plain mean-
ing" of a statute, and that it would not justify the universal
application of the literalistic approach. No considerations drawn
from the judicial desire to prevent disappointed expectation are
applicable in such cases as Caminetti v. United States,4 in which
the plain meaning rule was, nevertheless, applied. The more
basic point, however, is that the assumption upon which the
predictability argument is based, that the words of a statute can
be taken to possess a single necessary "plain meaning," apart
from their full context, is open to serious question. When judges
apply the plain meaning rule in the decision of an actual case,
they are saying not only that a particular designated meaning
of the statute is plain, but also that the statutory language is
not reasonably capable of suggesting any other meaning. It
may be pointed out that the confidence of judges in their ability
to determine the necessary true meaning frequently seems not
to be affected by the circumstance that the supposed necessary
"plain meaning" was neither necessary nor plain to the persons
who actually drew up the enactment, or to other judges who may
have interpreted the statutory language.
Students of the symbolic aspects of language are generally
agreed that it is unrealistic to consider words as possessed of
any absolute meaning, apart from the psychological reference
which they symbolize.5 If a judge is not to attempt to discover
the reference which was in the minds of those responsible for
the enactment of a statute, he must substitute some other refer-
ence occasioned by the words. In the cases in which the plain
meaning rule is actually given controlling effect, the deciding
judge would deny indignantly that he might be substituting for
the reference of the authors, the reference which the statutory
language occasions to himself. The fact that the plain meaning
rule is usually justified as required in the interests of legal pre-
dictability indicates that what the judges are attempting to do
is to determine the thought or reference which the language of
64. (1917) 242 U. S. 470.
65. Ogden & Richards, The Meaning of Meaning (1923); Chase, The
Tyranny of Words (1938).
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the statute would occasion to a hypothetical average person,
governed by the accepted usages of speech. 6
In other words, the assumption of the rule of literalness is
that a statutory meaning which seems necessary to an inter-
preting judge will also have seemed necessary to any other per-
son who may have referred to the language of the statute for
guidance in his action. The many instances in which judges
have disagreed as to what the "plain meaning" of a particular
statute actually was, however, indicate that the literalistic ap-
proach is not as completely objective as it may appear to be. It
is quite possible, for example, that the meaning which the statu-
tory language bore to the legislators is the meaning which it
will suggest to those referring to it in advance of litigation. All
interpretation involves a choice among possible meanings which
language may be taken to suggest. The possibility that a statute
may have possessed a meaning to its framers different from that
which it suggests to an interpreting judge is certainly worthy
of consideration by that judge, at least as a check against purely
personal and subjective interpretation on his part.
In the opinion of the present writer, no adequate case can be
made out to justify the employment of the plain meaning doc-
trine as a flat rule of exclusion, barring resort to extrinsic evi-
dence of legislative meaning or purpose, in all cases in which a
statute suggests a single necessary meaning to the judges who
happen to be its interpreters. It is freely conceded that it would
be unjust to attribute a distorted meaning to statutory language,
and so to penalize individuals who have acted in good faith upon
the apparent meaning of a statutory direction. But it would
seem that a judge can have no assurance that the meaning which
the statute suggests to him is the meaning which it suggested
to individuals acting in reliance upon the statute, unless he has
canvassed all of the possible interpretations of which the statu-
tory language is subject.
It follows that extrinsic aids should be resorted to, at the
outset, in every case, in order to reveal, if possible, what the
statute meant to those responsible for its enactment.Y If, after
66. " * * * it is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the
world in language that the common world will understand, of what the
law intends to do if a certain line is passed." Holmes, J., in McBoyle v.
United States (1931) 283 U. S. 25, 27.
67. Compare the conclusion reached by Prof. Powell in Construction of
Written Instruments (1932) 14 Ind. L. J. 309, 336.
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careful consideration of this intended meaning, the interpreting
judge nevertheless comes to the conclusion that the actual legis-
lative intention was so badly expressed as to mislead individuals
acting in reliance upon the statute, it is doubtless proper that
the judge should refuse to give effect to the legislative under-
standing of the act.6 8 But this serious compromising of the
underlying theory of statutory interpretation is at all justifiable
only in cases in which the enforcement of a statute according to
the legislative meaning or purpose would result in injustice to
persons who have, in fact, acted in reliance upon the statute, and
would suffer from its interpretation in a distorted version.
Words are not precise mathematical symbols, and an approach
to statutory interpretation which treats them as if they were,
must be wholly unrealistic. The meaning of a word is qualified
by the sentence in which it is used, and the thought expressed
by the sentence becomes more definite when the sentence is con-
sidered in the light of the entire document in which it is con-
tained. It is generally established that in the interpretation of
statutes and other written instruments, courts will read a docu-
ment as an entirety, rather than seriatim, by clauses.69 The re-
sort to extrinsic aids may be considered, from this point of view,
as a means by which statutory language can be placed in its
full context, without thorough comprehension of which an inter-
preting judge cannot make an intelligent choice among the sev-
eral alternative meanings which any form of words is normally
capable of suggesting. A statutory meaning which appears to
be unreasonable upon a bare reading of the text of a statute may
well appear to be a permissible and proper one in the light of the
circumstances of the passage of the enactment, and of the ob-
jectives which the members of the legislature sought to attain
by its enactment.
The theoretical objectivity of the plain meaning rule tends to
68. Restriction of the plain meaning rule to cases of this character
would, of course, greatly decrease the number of cases falling within the
theoretical scope of its application. Nor would the doctrine operate as a
fiat rule of exclusion of extrinsic aids in any case. If the interest of pre-
dictability is really the basis of the plain meaning rule, it seems wholly
reasonable to confine the application of the doctrine to situations in which
the predictability argument is really appropriate. But quaere whether
greater predictability should be required of the statute law than is pos-
sessed by the common law.
69. R. Powell, Construction of Written Instruments (1939) 14 Ind. L.
J. 199, 210.
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conceal the danger that the doctrine will result merely in the
adoption of the thought which the terms of the statute occasion
to the judge, in preference to the thought which the members
of the legislature may have intended to convey. Unless the inter-
preting judge is fully aware of the legislative background of
an enactment, it is quite possible that the conclusions to which
he may come will result in the obstruction of the deliberately
adopted legislative policy.70 The plain meaning rule, if rigor-
ously applied, would have the effect, within the scope of its ap-
plication, of withdrawing from the consideration of judges the
facts which constitute the necessary basis of effective statutory
interpretation. It may be that the interest of predictability is
of sufficient weight to justify occasional interpretations which
derogate from the intention of the law-making body. Such judi-
cial action is hardly defensible, however, unless the judge is
fully convinced that the meaning which the words of a statute
bear to him, rather than some other meaning which they may
have borne to the legislators, is the one which was suggested
to the individuals who have, in fact, acted upon the statute.
That assurance is impossible unless the statute has been read
in its full legislative context, with adequate resort to all per-
suasive extrinsic aids.
The most significant evidence of the barrenness of a literal-
istic approach to statutory interpretation is, of course, that the
federal courts have come to make use of extrinsic aids in vir-
tually every case, despite the theoretical restriction of the plain
meaning rule. The principle that extrinsic aids may be con-
sidered to co-)firm the literal or "plain" meaning of statutory
language,71 that is to show that the literal meaning is also the
meaning which the legislators intended, has provided a loophole
permitting the introduction of extrinsic aids in many cases, and
it is by no means clear that such evidence has been considered
70. Jennings, Courts and Administrative Law-The Experience of En-
glish Housing Legislation (1936) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 426; Amos, The Inter-
pretation of Statutes (1934) 5 Camb. L. J. 163.
71. United States v. Missouri Pac. R. R. (1929) 278 U. S. 269, 278.
For examples of such confirmatory reference to extrinsic aids see: Dunlap
v. United States (1899) 173 U. S. 65; Margolin v. United States (1925)
269 U. S. 93; Tagg Bros. & Moorehead v. United States (1930) 280 U. S.
420; Federal Trade Comm. v. Raladam Co. (1931) 283 U. S. 643; Fox v.
Standard Oil Co. (1935) 294 U. S. 87. And see: Jeu Jo Wan v. Nagle
(C. C. A. 9, 1925) 9 F. (2d) 309; Cully v. Mitchell (C. C. A. 10, 1930)
37 F. (2d) 493; United States v. Hess (C. C. A. 8, 1934) 71 F. (2d) 78.
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only after the court had come to a final conclusion as to the
literal meaning of the statutory text. The flat exclusionary rule
has been whittled away, or openly ignored, because the federal
courts, particularly the Supreme Court, have come to recognize
the value of extrinsic aids, not merely to resolve doubts sug-
gested upon a prior and literal meaning of the bare statutory
text, but to make possible an intelligent comprehension of the
meaning and purpose of the statute at every stage of interpre-
tation.7 2 It is regrettable that the doctrine of the Supreme Court
has not, in this instance, kept pace with practice, and that the
acceptance of extrinsic aids is still subject to the hazard of pos-
sible exclusion of relevant and persuasive evidence, through rigid
application of the plain meaning rule.
72. R. Powell, Construction of Written Instruments (1939) 14 Ind. L. J.
199, 309.
Washington University Open Scholarship
